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Abstract. The overall purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the adoption and commitment to the death penalty 
in a given State.  A State may have the penalty because it serves as a deterrent or perhaps because it represents the just deserts 
for capital crimes; or maybe both. This paper explores three overall hypotheses: the “need” or deterrence hypothesis, the “desire” 
hypothesis, and the combination of both. Using a policy analysis framework, I run logit analyses for the pre-Furman and post-
Furman periods in the US to test my hypotheses. Finding evidence that death penalty statutes are the result of legislative 
response to the murder rate and the public´ sentiment towards the death penalty, I conduct and discuss a case application of these 
findings and conclude that public opinion in favor of capital punishment is relevant but not sufficient for adopting, readopting, or 
keeping the death penalty. Regardless of whether policymakers believe in the deterrent force of capital punishment to reduce 
violent crime, they rely on the need for it to justify its adoption or readoption. 
 
 
Capital punishment in the US is and has been for centuries a question of public and 
academic interest.  It remains a research topic of compelling interest to spheres of study and to all 
sides of the political spectrum. On the public dimension of this issue, it is the moral aspect 
surrounding the legitimacy of a given State´s prerogative of imposing the penalty of death that has 
fuelled the public debate and has led to the spread of abolitionist groups. The academic side to the 
debate has been to a great degree directed at the question of whether capital punishment deters. This 
paper takes a different approach. 
The question of interest in this paper is why some States have the death penalty and others 
do not. Is it the deterrence rationale that drives death penalty legislation or is it opinion? Or both? 
And if they have some influence on the final outcome of adopting or retaining the death penalty, do 
these factors have a direct or indirect impact? Our dependent variable of interest here is statutory 
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commitment to the death penalty. According to the literature on capital punishment, the deterrence 
rationale for justifying the presence of the maximum form of penal severity is not the sole argument 
for adopting the death penalty. More recently, scholarly interest in the death penalty has taken on a 
policy-making point of view, where the question has also become one of investigating what spurs 
the adoption or change in status of death capital punishment policy. Academics are studying the 
effects of politics and public opinion on policy outcomes, particularly the relationship between 
capital punishment and public opinion (Tyler and Weber 1982; Nice 1992; Harries and Cheatwood 
1997; Mooney and Lee 2000).  
One can imagine that policymakers could justify the presence of the death penalty statute 
because a given State needs it to serve as a deterrent force, given its inherent instrumental purpose, 
and/or because the death penalty is just punishment for the crime of murder regardless of any real 
need for it, suggesting that those States whose median voters and policymakers want it will have it. 
In this case, it is desire, as opposed to need, that makes the real difference to a State having the 
death penalty on the books. These are the two pillars on which rests public support for the death 
penalty. 
Having been suspended for a brief period during this century in the US, roughly a decade 
beginning in the mid 1960s, the death penalty allows policy scholars and analysts to employ useful 
research strategies especially designed to make use of policy interruptions.  Very little is known 
about which of the two factors, the need or the desire for the death penalty, brings the most to bear 
on the understanding of why State legislators make the decisions they do in regard to capital 
punishment. Both lines of argument have been addressed in the literature on death penalty 
legislation and reform, but taken together the few existing studies have provided ambiguous results. 
   
Although commonly invoked as a justification for adopting, retaining, or abolishing the death 
penalty statute, the deterrence argument has rarely been tested when assessing the determinants 
behind the policy adoption of the death penalty. More frequent are studies that estimate the impact 
the death penalty may have on the homicide rate. This has been the dominant relationship of 
interest in the literature.  Few scholars have asked how the status of death penalty laws is at all 
affected by changes in the murder rate. Most students of deterrence theory would argue that the real 
deterrent effect, if any, lies with the implementation of the death penalty and not the death penalty 
per se.  However, before one can assess the effectiveness of executions as criminal deterrent 
measures—that is, the death penalty on the right-hand side—it is appropriate to pause and ask 
whether or not States have the death penalty due to the belief that it produces a deterrent effect—the 
death penalty on the left-hand side.    
The scarce empirical results on this subject suggest that the deterrence argument may not 
play as real a role in deciding whether or not to have or retain the death penalty. Descriptive 
statistics alone suggest that the evolution of the homicide rate in the US has not always provided a 
clear picture of a deterrent effect. This is easily depicted by the oscillating pattern of the murder 
rate, independent of the period when the death penalty was and was not in effect. The fact that the 
murder rate has also not always followed an inverse course compared to the execution rate also 
casts some doubt on the deterrence argument. These are often arguments that opponents of the 
death penalty raise when debating the (non)deterrent effect of the death penalty. 1  On the other 
hand, death penalty advocates hang on to the idea that during the moratorium of the death penalty 
the homicide rate did indeed rise, providing some support for the deterrent argument (Harries and 
Cheatwood 1997).  
   
James Q. Wilson (1975, 192) once said that “[a]t best, deterrence studies show that legally 
abolishing capital punishment in States that had only rarely imposed it does not lead to any increase 
in homicide, and States that rarely execute murderers do not have any more murders than States that 
never do. The crucial question, at least, for those debating the deterrence issue, is whether I can 
ever say any more than this.” Without aspiring to settle this dispute, this paper seeks to contribute to 
the debate by exploring the opposite causal flow between the death penalty and the murder rate and 
by studying other possible determinants for the legal allowance for the death penalty. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, I review the contributions in the literature 
on the death penalty as they pertain to the central purpose of the paper and develop the propositions 
of interest. Next, I examine and discuss the nature of the data, and using a policy analysis 
framework, I estimate logit analyses of the determinants of the death penalty policy retention and 
re-adoption in the pre-Furman and post-Furman periods. Finally, I explore a case application of the 
findings by looking at how state policy on the death penalty changed in the years following the 
Furman case. 
Death Penalty Policy in America 
More than a quarter of a century has passed since Furman vs. Georgia (1972), when the 
Supreme Court pronounced itself on the arbitrariness and cruelty of the application of the death 
penalty. It ruled that the death penalty statute in the State of Georgia did not guarantee protection 
against arbitrary sentencing. As it stood in 1972, this statute gave complete discretion to the jury, 
thereby jeopardizing the Eighth Amendment protecting citizens against cruel and unusual 
punishment. This decision effectively resulted in nullifying 40 death penalty statutes and revoking 
629 inmates on death row nationwide, thus suspending the death penalty. But it also left open the 
   
possibility for States to draw up statutes that could be constitutionally permissible in court. This 
was a time when the rest of the Western democratic world already had or was still doing away with 
the death penalty. The US is among the very few Western democracies that still keeps the death 
penalty in force (Hood 1996; Newman 1999).  
In the history of capital punishment policy in America, the debate has mostly taken place in 
the political forum; only a handful of landmark Supreme Court cases—all roughly in the 1970s—
have made their mark on the policy of killing individuals convicted of capital offences.2 Since the 
mid 1980s, the courts have retreated from any involvement in the discussion on capital punishment 
policy (Haines 1996), meaning the ball has since then returned solely to the political arena. This in 
turn means that legislators have been faced with the necessity to balance the need for the death 
penalty and the desire for it. 
   Today and for a long time, Americans have generally favored the death penalty to serve as 
a vehicle for justice, retribution, and/or vengeance, on the one hand, and deterrence on the other. 
Ever since American opinion was first polled in 1936 (Erskine 1970; Vidmar and Ellsworth 1974; 
Bohm 1987), favorable opinion has never fallen below 50%, except for the early 1960s when the 
percentage in favor of the death penalty hit an all time bottom in 1966—42% (US Department of 
Justice). Opinion surveys, having taken place throughout abolitionist cycles continued to show that 
American opinion in favor of the death penalty was still a majority and it continued to increase 
substantially in the years following the Furman case. The Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
(US Department of Justice) reports that in 1976, 66% of Americans favored the death penalty, 67% 
in 1980, and 76% in 1985. Despite the diminished growth in the percentage of those favoring the 
death penalty in recent years, dropping from the all time high of about 80% in the early 90s to 66% 
   
in 2000, the percentage of those favoring of the death penalty is still much greater than the 
percentage of those against it.  
Since 1997, all Council of Europe member States have issued a total moratorium on the 
death penalty.  During that very year in the US, we see a very different picture: 38 out of 50 States 
endorse the death penalty law and over 3,000 inmates are sentenced to die. Since 1994, US 
policymakers have made over 60 crimes punishable by death, and executions have increased from 
approximately two per 100,000 persons in 1982 to about 55 per 100,000 persons in 1995 and 98 in 
1999 (Acker 1997; Pridemore 1997; Newman 1999).3 Why has the US opted to keep a capital 
punishment system in place while most all of the democratized world has abandoned it in the last 
half century?  Is it that the death penalty has a deterrent effect and the rest of the democratized 
Western world chooses to ignore the need for it? Is it because the American public desires it while 
European publics, among others, do not? According to the American Society of Criminology, the 
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and the Law & Society Association, crime experts do not 
believe the death penalty has proven to be an effective deterrent to murder. Herbert Haines (1996) 
and Julian Roberts (1992) tell us that these countries chose to be rid of the death penalty in spite of 
the public sentiment that still managed to favor the retention of the death penalty. It was not the 
public, nor the courts, that chose abolition. It was the legislators.  They alone, against the tide of 
public sentiment removed the death penalty from the statutes. Hiroyuki Shinkai and Ugljesa Zvekic, 
two UN experts on crime (1999, 112), claim that “[p]olicy-makers may well respond that all they 
do is translate into practice what the public wants.” That may well be true of American 
policymaking, where populist policymaking is common (Norrander and Wilcox 2001). But if we 
knew that, for example, the British and German policymakers did away with the death penalty, in 
   
1965 and 1987 respectively, when the majority of the British and German public favored it (Tonry 
1999; Ziesel and Gallup 1989), some of us might wonder whether the close tie between policy and 
opinion is true of most countries. Similar tendencies occurred in Canada, Australia, and more 
recently, Russia (Roberts 1992; Pridemore 1997; Newman 1999). “Many citizens of the United 
Kingdom, France, and elsewhere would prefer that executions resume in their lands. But these 
attitudes rarely lead to serious reintroduction drives.  In the United States, by contrast, elected 
officials scramble to capitalize on pro-death penalty sentiment.” (Haines 1996: 4).   
Available statistics provide mixed support for the notion that governments follow public 
sentiment when it comes to policymaking. International survey results indicate, for instance, that 
British support was 49% in 1938, grew to 76% in 1964 shortly prior to its total abolition, and was 
still going strong by the mid 1990s (Erskine 1970; Hastings and Hastings 1978-79, 1984-85; Gallup 
1978, 1979). Seventy percent of the British population in 1965—the year the death penalty was 
abolished—believed the murder rate would go up in the absence of the death penalty (Erskine 
1970). Available international survey results also show that French public support for the death 
penalty was 39% in 1960, 54% in 1972, 64% in 1984 just three years after the total abolition of the 
death penalty and only began to wane by the early 1990s, slightly falling to 61%. The opposite 
occurred in Germany where the death penalty was done away with in 1987 for all crimes. German 
support for the death penalty was 55% in 1950, decreased to 34% in 1975, 27% in 1980, and 24% 
in 1992 (Erskine 1970; Hastings and Hastings 1978-79, 1984-85; Gallup 1978, 1979). Spanish 
results show minor support for capital punishment, 47% in 1979, one year after Spain abolished the 
death penalty for ordinary but not extraordinary crimes. More recently, survey results in Portuga, 
where the death penalty has not been in existence for ordinary crimes since the late nineteenth 
   
century and for all crimes since 1976, revealed that only a minority favored the death penalty—43% 
(Fernandes 1995). 
The Death Penalty, Deterrence, and the Public Sentiment 
Since the Supreme Court suspension of the death penalty in the US in 1972, two basic 
theoretical explanations have emerged in the political science and criminal justice policy literatures 
to explain support for the death penalty.  These are the deterrence hypothesis and the desire 
hypothesis. The first proposition is rooted in Benthamite utilitarianism; that is, the death penalty is 
employed as a strategy to satisfy the happiness (in this case the safety) of the whole—non-capital 
offenders and law abiding citizens—at the cost of a few—the capital offenders. The death penalty is 
the result of a need to reduce the crime rate; the belief that the threat of maximal severity serves as a 
deterrent against murder is the justification for its use. Homicidal behavior, according to this view, 
can arguably be treated as rational in many, although of course not all cases, thus prospective 
murderers can be argued to assess the costs of deciding whether or not to kill. The other hypothesis 
is based on the pure desire to have the death penalty, that is, on the thirst for justice or the 
satisfaction of imposing one´s just deserts for committing a capital offense.  This proposition 
centers on the influence of political and social values and also legislators´ aim for reelection on the 
decision to adopt the death penalty.  
The Need for the Death Penalty: Deterrence and Capital Punishment. The deterrence argument 
pertaining to capital punishment became a central premise at the start of the post-Furman period 
with Isaac Ehrlich´s controversial seminal piece (1975), based on the Becker model (1968) of the 
economic approach to crime, finding support for a deterrent effect. Ehrlich finished his manuscript 
on the deterrent effect of the death penalty at a time the Supreme Court was going to consider the 
   
constitutionality of the first death penalty statutes following Furman vs. Georgia. At this time the 
Supreme Court was inclined to approve the new statute and, therefore, sought and contemplated 
Ehrlich´s work at a time when it had not been published yet. Until the Furman case, Thorsten 
Sellin´s (1959) work on the effects of the death penalty went nearly uncontested. Although the 
debate on the death penalty goes back much further (Bye 1919; Kirkpatrick 1925; Sutherland 1925; 
Vold 1932; Peterson and Bailey 1988),4 it was not until the 1950s that statistical analyses were first 
conducted (Vold 1952; Schuessler 1952; Sellin 1952; 1959; Mueller and Schuessler 1961; Klein et 
al. 1978). Sellin´s work was sharply criticized on methodological grounds.5 These critiques threw a 
cloud of doubt over Sellin´s insistence that the death penalty was no more a deterrent than other 
punishments. 
Studies on the deterrent effects of capital punishment began to flourish since Ehrlich´s study 
in the early 1970s. Since the Ehrlich 1975 piece, the death penalty remains the most researched 
issue in deterrence theory or at least that topic that has generated the most controversy. This is so, 
not only surrounding the ethics of employing this deterrent strategy but also whether it has the 
deterrent power many wish to attribute it since the early beginnings of the study of crime. No other 
deterrence theory application has generated so much debate as the deterrence effect of capital 
punishment, mostly because of its high salience as a political and moral issue and because 
deterrence theory, as applied to violent crimes, is highly debatable. Perhaps for these reasons, 
capital punishment policy has been referred to as the “morality” policy per excellence. 
Inspired by the polemic study, students of crime began to address and debate the weaknesses 
in Sellin´s and Ehrlich´s works through more sophisticated techniques. Much of this literature 
produced ambiguous results (Klein et al. 1978; McGahey 1980; Von Hirsch 1999), with some 
   
scholars finding a deterrent effect (Ehrlich 1975; 1977; Yunker 1976; Wolpin 1978; Layson 1985; 
Stack 1987; Phillips 1980) and others failing to do so (Bowers and Pierce 1975; 1980; Passell and 
Taylor 1977; Cochran et al. 1994; Thomson 1997; Bailey and Peterson 1994). The controversy 
generated more enhanced information on deterrent effects, some claiming that the failure to find 
deterrent effects was due to the failure to use monthly data on executions and also on the choice of 
the specific type of murder (Phillips 1980; Stack 1987; Bailey and Peterson 1994). Others claimed 
that while capital punishment may deter, its impact is very short-lived and may even contribute to a 
rise in the number of homicides (Thomson 1997). Indeed, some spoke of this as the “death dip” 
hypothesis Bowers and Pierce (1980), often cited as the first to introduce the sociologically-based 
“brutalization” hypothesis, argued that not only is there no evidence of a deterrent effect, but the 
death penalty can lead potential murderers to identify themselves with the State in justifying the 
right to take a life on the basis of bestowing justice (Decker and Kohfeld 1990; Cochran et al. 1994; 
Thomson 1997).  
The Desire for the Death Penalty: Public Opinion and Capital Punishment. V.O. Key (1961) is 
well remembered for asserting that public values guide policy, but Robert Erikson (1976) was 
among the first to raise the issue of a relationship between public opinion and capital punishment 
statutes. Using information from opinion surveys in the mid 1930s, he found a high degree of 
association between those States having had the death penalty on the books continuously—what he 
labelled as a strong commitment to capital punishment—and those States whose citizenry favored 
the existence of the death penalty.  
While the empirical investigation of the deterrent effects of capital punishment grew in the 
post-Furman period, the same is not true of the empirical studies on the connection between 
   
policymaking and opinion. William Bowers (1993) took up Neil Vidmar and Phoebe Ellsworth´s 
(1974) the argument on the influence of public opinion on judicial policymaking and on the 
reluctance to use the Eighth Amendment to oppose the death penalty as long as the majority 
approves of it.  Bowers´s point was to show the spuriousness of public support for the death 
penalty, his argument being that the public´s favor was really “[…] a spurious function of people´s 
desire for harsh but meaningful punishment for convicted murderers […] deep-seated or strongly 
held commitment to capital punishment.” (pp. 159-62). Despite Bower´s main concern, he 
nonetheless emphasized an important point for the present study which was that the Court had 
decided on the death penalty based on its popularity with the public. 
On the empirical side, Tom Tyler and Renee Weber (1982) found that support for the death 
penalty is grounded on the ideological inclination of the public as a determinant of the death 
penalty. Using people´s concern for crime to represent what these authors call the utilitarian or 
instrumental hypothesis and their political attitudes in regard to the death penalty to represent what 
they call the “symbolic” hypothesis, their evidence shows that only the public´s political viewpoint 
on the death penalty provided any significant impact on the existence of the death penalty. People´s 
concern for the crime problem was not the key ingredient in explaining why a State did or did not 
have the death penalty.  
In the political science literature two studies are worth taking notice. These are the 
contributions of David Nice (1992) and, more recently, Christopher Mooney and Mei-Hsien Lee 
(2000). Nice was among the first to test the causal relationship between electorate ideology or level 
of conservative opinion among the electorate and the death penalty, arguing, as Erikson and others 
before him, that “[…]  in a context of high public interest and substantial uncertainty regarding the 
   
effectiveness of a policy, officials have strong incentive to respond to public desires. Even if the 
policy is not particularly effective in resolving the problem, officials have at least made a symbolic 
response.” (1992, 1046).  Nice found evidence to support the notion that both a more conservative 
public climate of opinion and a high murder rate call for a greater push for death penalty statutes. 
Contrary to the Nice piece (1992) that looks at death penalty determinants in general, the link 
between opinion and capital punishment support is central to the Mooney and Lee (2000) piece. 
These authors propose and test a fine line of distinction between how public sentiment is considered 
depending on the context of public values.  Whether or not the climate surrounding the morality 
issue is largely consensual, meaning the public is less divided on the subject, or more contentious or 
split, meaning that the dividing line is less certain, determines how policymakers respond and to 
whom they respond.  Where contentious issues are concerned, legislators tend to pay attention to 
the masses and not so much to political elites, in this way not putting themselves at risk of being 
considered democratically detached from the constituents.  When deciding on issues where the 
public is less emotionally divided, such as in the situation with public opinion on the death penalty 
in the post-Furman period, legislators are more willing to stress their own views and that of the 
more informed public. In testing their thesis, Mooney and Lee (2000) found that only elite opinion 
had a significant influence on the re-adoption of the death penalty statutes in the post-Furman era, 
while only mass public support influenced the decision to keep or abolish the death penalty in the 
pre-Furman period.  Both studies test the effect of the murder rate on the death penalty.  Of these 
two papers, only Nice finds an effect of the murder rate. Mooney and Lee (2000) do not report 
estimates of the effect of the murder rate, but they indicate that, among several control variables, 
they tested for such an effect and did not find one. This may at first seem intriguing, but upon more 
   
careful consideration, we really should not expect to see an effect from murder in this case. We 
must keep in mind that these two papers employ entirely different research designs; thus, they 
answer two entirely different questions.  Mooney and Lee use Event History Analysis (EHA) to 
look at whether the murder rate has an effect on the timing of the adoption of the death penalty. 
Nice uses OLS regression to study the status of the death penalty. The fact that Mooney and Lee do 
not find an effect of the murder rate only means that this rate does not affect the precise year that a 
given State adopted the death penalty; it says nothing about the effect of the murder rate on the 
status of the death penalty in a given State as such. 
Hypotheses 
The question of interest here is why some States have the death penalty and others do not. 
Do policymakers take into consideration the state of violent crime in their jurisdictions? Statistics 
tell us that most States that have the death penalty also have the highest murder rates (Death Penalty 
Information Center). Is the murder rate what leads these States to adopt the death penalty? Or might 
public opinion be the driving force?  Could they both be key determinants of the decision to have 
the maximum statutory severity for murder? These are the central questions raised in this paper. To 
address them, I test three hypotheses. I hypothesize that legislative commitment to the death penalty 
is influenced both by the perceived/arguable need to deter potential murderers and the desire to 
punish. Policymakers have deterrence-based reasons for adopting the maximum form of penal 
severity with the criminal justice goal of dissuading others from engaging in homicidal crimes, so 
that need, in the form of high capital crime rates, may a have a direct effect on the statutory 
existence of the death penalty. The decision to have the death penalty in a given State is influenced 
by whether that State´s murder rate suggests the need to impose a more severe deterrent threat; that 
   
is, whether State policymakers want to increase the expected cost of committing murder. 
Hypothesis 1: States with high murder rates are more likely to be committed to the death penalty—
the deterrent or need hypothesis. 
 
Second, legislative commitment to the death penalty may also be influenced by the desire to 
comply with or satisfy constituent demand for the death penalty. In this way, voter and policymaker 
opinion may also have a direct effect based on the desire to have it, independently of the need for it. 
Whether States adopted the death penalty in either the pre-Furman or the post-Furman period is the 
result of public opinion of the death penalty. 
Hypothesis 2: States with public opinion favoring the death penalty are more likely to be committed 
to the death penalty—the desire hypothesis. 
 
We also entertain the proposition that both the need and desire hypotheses are 
interdependent, meaning that the strength of either argument will depend on each other. Simply put, 
this means that, although both propositions are important in the consideration of a State´s statutory 
severity for murder, the need for a more deterrent threat for murder will be contingent on the degree 
to which public opinion is divided on the issue.   
Hypothesis 3: The electorate´s desire to have the death penalty will mediate the need to increase the 
expected cost of committing murder in a given State.  
 
A Preliminary Look at the Data on Capital Punishment, Opinion, and the Murder Rate 
The analysis in this paper examines the determinants of the status or commitment of State 
capital punishment before and after the interruption of the death penalty policy.  It is altogether 
fitting then to look at the variation in the outcome variable of interest. Table 1 does just this. It lists 
those States that were and were not committed to the death penalty in both the pre- and post-
Furman periods. A “yes” indicates a positive status on capital punishment policy, that is, a strong 
   
commitment to the death penalty and a “no” indicates otherwise (Erikson 1976). For the purpose of 
the present study, a strong commitment means that the State had and retained the death penalty 
from 1942 to 1972 in the pre-Furman period; in the post-Furman period, it means that States 
having adopted or readopted the death penalty from 1972 to 1977 retained the statute continuously 
until 1995. A look at the historical trends in US capital punishment policy suggests that the 1940s is 
an interesting decade to begin our pre-Furman period for the purpose of analysis. This is because 
the overall trend in executions in the US rose steadily from the seventeenth century, having peaked 
in the late 1930s (Harries and Cheatwood 1997; Espy and Smykla 1987). Beginning in the 1940s, 
this trend was one of a steadfast decline until the moratorium of the death penalty, making this a 
good point in time to examine States´ commitment to the death penalty in the pre-Furman period. 
Nineteen forty two also happens to be the year for which there is available data so it also turns out 
to be both methodologically and statistically convenient to begin in the 1940s. Nineteen seventy 
two is the year of Furman vs. Georgia, when the death penalty was formally and legally suspended. 
It marks the end of the pre-Furman period but also the beginning of the post-Furman era. This is 
because the State of Florida officially reinstated the death penalty in December of that year. The 
cut-off year of the post-Furman period is 1995; the State of New York was the last one to change 
its death penalty policy during this year. New Hampshire removed the death penalty in May of 
2000 and for this reason the post-Furman period could have extended until the present, however, 
available statistics for the year 2000 were not yet readily available. For this reason, New 
Hampshire´s most recent change in its capital punishment policy was not considered. 
[Table 1 about here] 
   
 Note that most all States carry their capital punishment policy in the pre-Furman period into 
the post-Furman period in the sense that they are consistent in their willingness to commit to the 
death penalty. Only a handful or less show mixed policy status positions:  Kansas, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Dakota. The shaded areas point out those 
States that did not show a strong commitment to the death penalty in either period.  With the 
exception of Massachusetts, nine of the 12 shaded States (plus Alaska and Hawaii that are not part 
of the present analysis due to missing values in the variables used in the analyses) have remained 
uncommitted to capital punishment as they remain today anti-death penalty States. These States are: 
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.    
As referred to above, James Q.Wilson (1975) claimed that States that had the death penalty 
prior to the 1972 Supreme Court suspension of the death penalty statutes would most likely readopt 
in the post-Furman period. Those that did not have it would probably continue without it when the 
opportunity to establish it arrived.  Judging from Table 1, one might speculate that he was right on 
the mark.  Why that might be gets to the root of our main concern in this analysis. Wilson suggested 
that when additional factors are taken into account statistically when attempting to explain the 
murder rate, the “additional importance of the death penalty, or its absence, to the analysis is likely 
to be slight.” (1975, 192-3). Two additional factors that Wilson may have had in mind when he 
wrote this are the crime rate, particularly the murder rate, and public opinion. A look at these 
factors in this era will show us that both these factors also appear stable. 
 Table 2 reveals the state-by-state opinion in the US in 1936 (Cantril 1951). A preliminary 
look at these data, which happen to constitute the only comprehensive set of state opinion data in 
   
the pre-Furman period, tells that in 1936, most States having the death penalty also had a majority 
of folks favoring the death penalty, most of them in the 60 and 70 percent range. At the time, these 
States without the death penalty (shaded areas in Table 2) had the smallest percentages of favorable 
opinions even though all but Wisconsin passed the 50-50 point.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Two important points are worth noting. The first is the nature of these opinion data; as with 
the dependent variable itself, they are quite static and slow-moving. For this reason, these 1936 data 
alone can be representative of the pre-Furman period. While this can be a good thing, statistically 
speaking, it can make one question the causal strength of these data. As a first pass at examining the 
relationship between opinion and the commitment to the death penalty, Figure 1a shows us the 
death penalty status (scored 1 for those States committed to the death penalty in the pre-Furman 
period and 0 for those States not committed) plotted against public opinion on the death penalty in 
the pre-Furman period. Three States stand out as outliers among the uncommitted: New York with 
67%; Vermont with 70%; and West Virginia with 71%. Among the strongly committed are four 
outliers: Colorado with 56%; Indiana with 54%; Oklahoma with 59%; and South Dakota with 52%. 
Figure 2a is a preliminary look at the bivariate relationship between these two factors. It shows how 
the probability of a State committed to the death penalty changes as the percentage in favor of the 
death penalty in the pre-Furman period increases. As we can see, the greatest change occurs around 
60%.  
Table 3 presents a crosstabular look at the pre-Furman commitment to the death penalty and 
public opinion. It allows us to identify the outliers in each situation. With the exception of 
Wisconsin, all States had a majority of their public favoring the death penalty. Notwithstanding 
   
this, it is interesting to note that three fourths of the States had very high percentages of persons in 
favor of the death penalty. Two-thirds of these 75% were strongly committed to the death penalty.  
Of the remaining 25% of States with comparably lower percentages in favor of the death penalty, 
two-thirds were anti-capital punishment States all throughout the pre-Furman period.6 
[Table 3 about here] 
As with public opinion, the murder rate is also quite slow-moving throughout the pre-
Furman period. Table 4 reveals the average ordinary mean murder rates for each State in the pre-
Furman period. The ordinary mean is a static or typical average. These average rates show some 
variation in the average murder rates across States but not across time.  Plotting the relationship 
between the death penalty and the murder rates in the beginning of the pre-Furman period, 1942, 
would show us that murder rates above 10% level are found in those States strongly committed to 
the death penalty statute. Although this makes intuitive logic, States having murder rates below the 
10% could equally be committed or not to pro-capital punishment legislation. A bivariate 
relationship between these two murder rates and the probability of change in the States´ status on 
the death penalty would show us that the average murder rate appears to cause the greatest change 
in the probability of a State´s commitment to the death penalty between the five and 10% level. The 
murder rate, as it stood in 1942, appears to cause a steady uphill change in this probability. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As in the case of public opinion on the death penalty, these data are not very dynamic. This 
might lead one to wonder how a change in the murder rate may cause any kind of change in a given 
State´s willingness to commit to the death penalty. Also shown in Table 4 are the developing mean 
murder rates for the pre-Furman era. The developing mean calls for a more careful explanation. It is 
   
the calculation of what in time series analysis is called the speed of adjustment or the coefficient of 
the lagged murder rates obtained from partial adjustment models. The dependent variable, in these 
models the murder rate, adjusts to an equilibrium or long run level of the murder rate. It is the ratio 
of the murder rate, were there no other causal intervention in the world to the speed of adjustment 
or one minus the coefficient of the lagged murder rate. In lay terms, this developing or dynamic 
mean is nothing more that the murder rate that each State can be expected to reach in a specified 
time period. In this way, it reveals the dynamics of the murder rate in each State for it tells us where 
the murder rate is heading and where it will end in equilibrium. Upon comparison, the ordinary or 
static murder rates in each State are not much different from the developing mean murder rates or 
the expected murder rates by the time we reach the end of the pre-Furman period, meaning that it 
does not seem as if the murder rates change much within States across the pre-Furman period.   
 
A simple look at naïve year dummy models indicates that there is not much of a yearly 
difference throughout the pre-Furman period.7 Yearly effects on the murder rate are very nearly the 
same when they reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Much of the variation lies with 
changes across States. Clearly the variation is across States, again building a case for the idea that 
the murder rates seem to be static. Murder rates may not change across several decades; rather the 
variation in the murder rate may be mostly cross-sectional.8  
Given that murder is not typically a responsive crime rate as are arguably property crimes, 
the murder rate is not expected to respond quickly or instantaneously to policy interventions such as 
the adoption of the death penalty, thus making it plausible to argue that the murder rate can and 
should be modelled as a partial adjustment model.  The gradual evolution in the murder rate allows 
us to speak of dynamics. The results of a partial adjustment model of the murder rate in the pre-
   
Furman period (not shown) show that death penalty policy is not at all immediate; this means that a 
shock or change in the system due to a policy intervention will not immediately take its toll on the 
murder rate. A pooled partial adjustment model of the pre-Furman period (not shown) reveals that 
the coefficient on the lagged murder rate is very high and unmistakably significant at the 
conventional levels of statistical significance. This means the speed of adjustment very slow and, 
consequently, the murder rate very sticky. The high coefficients of the lagged murder rate in the 
pooled analysis indicate that State rates are not moving toward a common target or equilibrium.  As 
a group, they are not adjusting, partially or otherwise. Individual state partial adjustment models 
(not shown) point us to the same idea.  The coefficients of the lagged murder rates allow us to infer 
that the States´ murder rates are adjusting at different speeds, and in many of the cases that actually 
reach statistical significance, those speeds are slow-moving and unresponsive to outside forces. 
Having provided some evidence of the static nature of the murder rate, Heise´s correlational test of 
stability (1969) provides further evidence that the murder rates are not very dynamic and that their 
targeted means are not much different from their ordinary means.9 
Research Design 
The research design employed is a cross-sectional design for the US States for two periods 
in time; I conduct a logit analysis of the determinants of the retention and readoption of the death 
penalty policy from 1942-95 in the pre-Furman and post-Furman periods.10 I examine the 
institutional, and political determinants of the adoption and readoption of the death penalty statutes 
in the US.  The purpose lies in contributing to the debate on whether death penalty reform is really 
about deterrence, opinion, or both.  Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables 
employed in this study. As we can see, the average number of States having shown a strong 
   
commitment to the death penalty is not much different in the pre- and post-Furman periods. From 
1942 until 1972, approximately 73% of the States adopted and revealed a strong commitment to the 
death penalty, as compared to 65% of the States that readopted and retained the death penalty 
statute from 1972 to 1995.  As for the murder rate, the average murder rate was 5.6 in the pre-
Furman period. In 1942, there were 7.8 murders per 100,000 persons, while in 1972 the typical 
murder rate was 7.5 per 100,000.Worth noting also is that in 1936 about two thirds of the 
population responded positively to the existence of the death penalty, even though only roughly 
over a third of the population had a traditionalistic political culture according to Elazar’s typology 
(1966). Perhaps the fact that only a third of the population was aged 15-34, the most-crime prone 
age bracket, might help account for this.  Although the two measures of public opinion for each of 
the periods are not directly comparable, the Senate National Election Survey measure (Norrander 
2001) of attitudes towards the death penalty indicates that on a scale from 1 to 5, the average 
position was strongly supportive of the death penalty.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Empirical Analysis and Discussion of the Findings 
 The following model depicts our view of the determinants of a State´s commitment to the 
death penalty:  
DP = β0 + β1Murder + β2ElectOpin+ β3 Murder*Elect Opin + β4PolCult1 + β5 PolCult2 + β6Urban 
where, DP is the commitment to the death penalty; Murder is the murder rate, representing a need 
for the death penalty; ElectOpin is electoral opinion, representing public desire for the death 
penalty; and Murder*Elect Opin is an interaction term representing the mediating effects that need 
or desire may have on each other. PolCult1 and PolCult2 are two dummy variables representing 
   
political culture; Urban is a demographic control for the level of urbanization. Table 6 shows the 
results of six logit analyses of the determinants of the commitment of the death penalty in each 
period under analysis. In conformity with Hypotheses 1 and 2, I find support for both the need and 
the desire hypotheses. Both the murder rate and public opinion have significant effects in the 
expected direction, although the effect of public opinion is more robust. It reaches statistical 
significance in every case, whereas the effect of the murder rate is more sensitive to the extension 
of the model, specifically to the inclusion of the interaction term between the murder rate and 
public opinion.  
 Our evidence shows that policymakers take into consideration both the need for the death 
penalty as well as the public´s desire to have it, judging from the significant coefficients of the 
murder rate and the opinion variable. There is no indication that the two arguments mediate each 
other because the coefficient on the interaction term never reaches statistical significance. Neither 
operates as a necessary condition. Were it not for the significant direct effects of the murder rate in 
models 1-3, I would have no indication as to whether the murder rate has any effect on the status of 
the death penalty or what the nature of that effect is—direct or mediating. This is because this effect 
disappears once the interaction of the need and will hypotheses is introduced, most likely due to 
multicollinearity. Judging from the summary statistics, we can see that the inclusion of the 
interaction term does not improve the fit. 
These results do not mean that policymakers necessarily believe in the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment. In fact, from our previous partial adjustment model of the murder rate, 
policymakers really have no reason to suspect that the murder rate would change much given the 
introduction of a policy directed at reducing it, namely the death penalty. Keeping in mind that 
   
whether the death penalty serves as an effective deterrent or not is not a relevant question for our 
purposes here, what I have shown is that the deterrence argument can be used to elaborate 
arguments to justify having it. Policymakers do not have to believe that having the death penalty 
would reduce the murder rates in their States. The only inference this model allows us to draw is the 
fact that policymakers base their position on the murder rate to pass legislation to retain or readopt 
the death penalty. It is used as a justification to have it or not on the books. 
 [Table 6 about here] 
Case Application and Discussion 
In accordance with the evidence presented above, besides the demand, policymakers pay 
attention to the need for the death penalty. But the death penalty has been cited as an example of a 
policy for which a given society may not have a real need.  Simply having it on the books does not 
cost policymakers much, making it a likely candidate for being tagged as a morality policy.  
Thereby, having the death penalty statute may rest solely with policymakers´ will to have it 
regardless of whether a State needs it or not.  Given the arguable nature of the need for the death 
penalty, to what extent is need relevant for deciding whether or not to retain or readopt the death 
penalty? One way to find out is to look at the decisions State policymakers made following the 
Supreme Court decision to lift the moratorium of the death penalty. Policymakers wanting to adopt 
the death penalty could justify support for the death penalty by pointing to the idea that there is a 
need for it and also a public demand for it.  
Given the interruption in the death penalty and our research design, I can check whether the 
results of my model have any worldly meaning. If a State wished to readopt the death penalty in the 
post-Furman period that State could readopt it simply based on the public´s desire to have it. But 
   
policymakers might also wish to justify a need for readopting the death penalty in their States.  
They can do this if one or both of the following situations occurred in the pre-Furman period: 1.) 
the State had a high murder rate compared to other States; and 2.) the State perceived an increase or 
gain in the murder rate. Still other States, where these situations do not apply, one could justify the 
readoption of the death penalty based on the reason that the murder rate is low is because the State 
had the death penalty previously.  Therefore, failing to adopt the death penalty could result in the 
rise of the murder rate in the post-Furman period. Anyway you see it, an argument for the need for 
capital punishment could be made, provided there is the desire for it. The death penalty would be 
needed to bring down the murder rate in the first case or control the gain in the second. If we look 
back at Tables 1 and 4, we can see which States could justify a need for the death penalty as of 
1972 based on the comparison of the ordinary and equilibrium murder rates of the States that were 
committed or not to having the death penalty in the pre-Furman period. The States of California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin could 
make a case for readopting the death penalty given the gain in the murder rate in the pre-Furman 
period.  If we just compare the murder rates in the same period across the States of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia could argue that they need the death penalty to bring 
down the murder rate.  
Why did not all States rush to draw up new death penalty legislation in conformity with 
Furman vs. Georgia, especially if they had been committed to the death penalty up until Furman? 
In other words, why did some States, namely Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota not readopt the death penalty by 1977, the year 
   
of the first execution following the 10-year-long moratorium, when most States that had the death 
penalty in the pre-Furman period had already done so by then? Indeed, by then 32 of the 35 
committed States in the pre-Furman period had already readopted the death penalty and not one of 
the previously anti-capital punishment States had readopted it, regardless of any need for it. It 
appears as if the vast majority of the States sought to return to the status quo in the pre-Furman 
period.  Only Oregon readopted the death penalty statute in 1978. New Mexico and South Dakota 
readopted it in 1979. It was not until 1982 that New Jersey readopted; and it took New Hampshire 
over 10 years to do so, adopting it in 1991. Kansas waited until 1994 and New York—the last State 
to readopt—until 1995. Of these States, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Dakota 
were pro-capital punishment States in the pre-Furman period, whereas the remaining three States 
were not. Interestingly, all of these States´ public were strongly in favor of the death penalty in the 
pre-Furman period, as they scored approximately four out of five points on the SNES opinion scale 
used to measure public opinion in the post-Furman period. However, none of them, whether 
previously committed or not, could justify the readoption of the death penalty as of 1972 because 
all of them had relatively low murder rates and none registered a noticeable gain in the murder rate. 
In fact, in New Jersey and New York, one could project a drop in the murder rate by comparing the 
ordinary average murder rate in this State with its targeted level. However, if one were to compare 
the equilibrium levels of the murder rate at the end of the pre- and post-Furman periods, one can 
see that all four States could indeed justify a need to adopt the death penalty when they did, given 
the sizable projected increase in their murder rates. This is an indication that policymakers in these 
States did indeed rely on the need argument when deciding on the severity of the penalty for 
murder. The desire for it could have been always there, but as it appears policymakers delayed the 
   
readoption until they could justify a need for it. 
Conclusion 
This analysis provides evidence that the decision to have the death penalty on the books in 
the US is fundamentally the result of the legislative response to the public sentiment towards the 
death penalty and the murder rate. If the majority was in favor of the death penalty, then it was 
highly likely that policymakers retained or readopted it. But this is not news to scholars interested 
in the impact of public opinion on capital punishment.  What I think may be novel is that 
policymakers also base their decisions on deterrence-based reasons or the need to have the death 
penalty. What the murder rate looks like or will look like makes a difference to policymakers, 
keeping them from simply translating public opinion into policy. Thus, both the deterrence or need 
and the desire hypotheses are important influents on capital punishment policymaking, at least in 
the US. Although the majority of deterrence scholars has been more interested in the reverse causal 
relationship between the death penalty and the murder rate, it may be worth pointing out that 
whether or not capital punishment is an effective deterrent, it is taken into account in policymaking 
as if it were.  
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Alabama Yes Yes 
Arizona Yes Yes 
Arkansas Yes Yes 
California Yes Yes 
Colorado Yes Yes 
Connecticut Yes Yes 
Delaware No Yes 
Florida Yes Yes 
Georgia Yes Yes 
Idaho Yes Yes 
Illinois Yes Yes 
Indiana Yes Yes 
Iowa No No 
Kansas Yes No 
Kentucky Yes Yes 
Louisiana Yes Yes 
Maine No No 
Maryland Yes Yes 
Massachusetts Yes No 
Michigan No No 
Minnesota No No 
Mississippi Yes Yes 
Missouri Yes Yes 
Montana Yes Yes 







Nebraska Yes Yes 
Nevada Yes Yes 
New Hampshire Yes No 
New Jersey Yes No 
New Mexico No No 
New York No No 
North Carolina Yes Yes 
North Dakota No No 
Ohio Yes Yes 
Oklahoma Yes Yes 
Oregon No No 
Pennsylvania Yes Yes 
Rhode Island No No 
South Carolina Yes Yes 
South Dakota Yes No 
Tennessee Yes Yes 
Texas Yes Yes 
Utah Yes Yes 
Vermont No No 
Virginia Yes Yes 
Washington Yes Yes 
West Virginia No No 
Wisconsin No No 
Wyoming Yes Yes 
 
 
Sources: Mooney and Lee (1999);  Nation al Prisoner Statisics (1974) 
Notes: 1.) A “Yes” denotes the uninterrupted existence of the death penalty statute (pro-capital punishment States).  
2.) The shading denotes those States that did not have an uninterrupted death penalty statute in  the pre- and post-Furman periods 
under analysis. For the purpose of this study, New Jersey, having abolished the death penalty only in January of 1972, was considered 
pro-capital punishment in the pre-Furman period. The boxes denote States with mixed positions on the commitment to the death 
penalty statutes in the pre- and post-Furman periods. 
3.) Two observations were dropped in the case of Nevada due to questionable data. Alaska and Hawaii were omitted due to missing 
   
observations on some variables. 
   
 Table 2: Percentage in Favor of the Death Penalty, 1936 
 
State Percentage  State Percentage 
Alabama 69  Nebraska 66 
Arizona 73  Nevada 84 
Arkansas 76  New Hampshire 72 
California 64  New Jersey 69 
Colorado 56  New Mexico 62 
Connecticut 67  New York 67 
Delaware 60  North Carolina 67 
Florida 75  North Dakota 58 
Georgia 75  Ohio 62 
Idaho 76  Oklahoma 59 
Illinois 70  Oregon 59 
Indiana 54  Pennsylvania 67 
Iowa 61  Rhode Island 52 
Kansas 63  South Carolina 68 
Kentucky 68  South Dakota 52 
Louisiana 68  Tennessee 69 
Maine 56  Texas 65 
Maryland 62  Utah 82 
Massachusetts 67  Vermont 70 
Michigan 53  Virginia 65 
Minnesota 55  Washington 68 
Mississippi 79  West Virginia 71 
Missouri 69  Wisconsin 49 
Montana 64  Wyoming 77 
 
Source: Cantril (1951) 
 
Notes:  The shaded areas denote States that did not have the death penalty in 1936. The States of Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia removed the death penalty statute prior to 1972. New Jersey abolished 
the death penalty in January of 1972. South Dakota reestablished the death penalty statute in 1939. 
   
Table 3: Crosstabulation of Pre-Furman Commitment to the Death Penalty and the 




D P  Commitment/Opinion 49-60% Favor Opinion 60-84% Favorable Opinion  




Alabama      Kentucky           New Jersey       Wyoming   64.6% 
Arizona        Louisiana           North Carolina 
Arkansas      Maryland           Ohio 
California     Massachusetts    Pennsylvania   
Connecticut  Mississippi        South Carolina 
Florida         Missouri            Texas 
Georgia        Montana            Tennessee 
Idaho            Nebraska           Utah 
Illinois          Nevada             Virginia 
Kansas         New Hampshire  Washington 
  
     
72.9% 


















   
   







State Ordinary Developing 
Alabama 15.395 13.847 
Arizona 6.888 6.916 
Arkansas 9.937 9.287 
California 4.890 10.800 
Colorado 4.664 5.023 
Connecticut 1.946 2.017 
Delaware 5.934 5.904 
Florida 12.076 11.626 
Georgia 16.141 15.241 
Idaho 2.857 3.009 
Illinois 5.963 7.194 
Indiana 4.321 4.505 
Iowa 1.459 2.811 
Kansas 3.582 3.564 
Kentucky 9.375 8.599 
Louisiana 9.806 9.666 
Maine 1.840 1.806 
Maryland 8.170 8.160 
Massachusetts 1.780 
Michigan 5.007 2.891 
Minnesota 1.370 1.452 
Mississippi 11.494 11.225 
Missouri 7.049 7.278 
   




State Ordinary Developing 
Montana 2.512 2.517 
Nebraska 2.591 2.546 
Nevada 8.723 8.873a 
New Hampshire 1.322 1.311 
New Jersey 3.182 1.827 
New Mexico 6.183 6.317 
New York 4.065 2.046 
North Carolina 11.393 10.809 
North Dakota 1.088 1.065 
Ohio 4.697 5.699 
Oklahoma 5.858 5.896 
Oregon 3.068 3.073 
Pennsylvania 3.387 3.909 
Rhode Island 1.407 1.406 
South Carolina 12.296 12.051 
South Dakota 1.889 1.854 
Tennessee 12.252 11.790 
Texas 11.245 10.796 
Utah 2.333 2.313 
Vermont 1.551 1.744 
Virginia 10.275 8.857 
Washington 3.015 3.133 
West Virginia 4.853 4.760 
Wisconsin 1.803 1.619 





 1.) The shading denotes those States that did not have an uninterrupted death penalty statute in both the pre- and post-Furman              
periods under analysis.  
2.) Two observations were dropped in the case of Nevada due to questionable data. Alaska and Hawaii were omitted due to missing 
observations on some variables. 
   
Table 5: Variables, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable Variable Description Source Mean/St. 
Dev. 
Min./Max. 
DPpost-Furman Dummy variable coded 1 if state reinstated the death 
penalty in the period 1972-77 and kept it continuously 





.646 .483 0 1 
DPpre-Furman Dummy variable coded 1 if state had an uninterrupted 




.729 .449 0 1 
Murder42 The number of murders per 100,000 (murder and 




7.750 6.949 .63 24.59 
Murder72 The number of murders per 100,000 (murder and 




7.494 4.592 1.2 18.5 
Murder The number of murders per 100,000 (murder and 




5.858 4.577 .200 25.350 
ElectOpinpost-Furman Attitude regarding the death penalty measured as a 
support scale 1-5 for the death penalty based on the the 
Senate National Election Study (SNES); high means 
more liberal attitude  
Norrander 
(forthcoming) 
1.951 .219 1.49 2.44 
ElectOpinpre-Furman Public opinion measured as the percentage of the 
population favoring the death penalty in the 1936 public 
opinion survey  
Cantril (1951) 4.049 .219 3.560 4.510 
Murder*Electpre-Furman Interaction between the murder rate in 1942 and pre-
Furman electorate opinion 
Computed 454.112 391.249 24.960 1585.500 
Murder*Electpost-Furman Interaction between the murder rate in 1972 and post-
Furman electorate opinion (using SNES attitude capital 
punishment) 
Computed 30.445 18.659 4.628 74.370 
Politcal Culture 1 Dummy variable representing Elazar´s political culture 
coded 1 if individualistic culture; 0 if otherwise  
Elazar (1966) .333 .476 0 1 
Political Culture 2 Dummy variable representing Elazar´s political culture 
coded 1 if traditionalistic culture; 0 if otherwise  
Elazar (1966) .313 .468 0 1 
Urbanization73 Proportion of the population living in a metropolitan 




.581 .242 .123 .933 
Urbanization42 Proportion of the population living in a metropolitan 




.481 .176 .214 .910 
 
* These data were obtained using linear interpolation due to missing data in non-census years. An exponential interpolation was also performed 
and generated similar results as the linear interpolation. 
 
 
Note: These data are state-level data; Hawaii and Alaska are omitted due to missing data in some of the variables.   
   
           
Table 6: Logit Analysis of Determinants of the Death Penalty in the Pre- and Post-Furman Periods 
 
Pre-Furman 
Retention   










Model  3 
 
Model  4 
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    Model  5  
 
 
  Model  6 
























Murder Rate .258**** 
(.010) 




















(high means greater support for 
























Murder*Public Opinion     
 
 













Political Culture 1              
(1 if individualistic) 
 
      
-1.701 
(2.185) 




Political Culture 2              
(1 if traditionalistic) 










N             45 48 45 45 45 45 48 48 48 48 48 48
Pseudo R2              .187 .232 .332 .349 .370 .390 .198 .230 .416 .421 .428 .471
% Correctly Predicted 80.000 79.170 84.440 86.670 82.220 84.440 70.830 81.250 83.330 83.330 83.330 81.250 
LL             -21.215 -21.547 -17.421 -16.988 -16.447 -15.915 -25.027 -24.020 -18.217 -18.076 -17.857 -16.511
  χ 2  6.710            8.570 10.420 8.530 12.510 14.600 8.890 7.910 16.020 14.710 16.410 20.760
****  p<.005; ***p<.01;  **p<.05; *p<.1 
 
Notes:   
1.) The values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.                
2.) These data are State-level data. 
3.) Hawaii and Alaska were omitted due to missing data in some of the variables. 
 
   
                                                          
 
1 This is aside from arguments pertaining to the possibility of tainted procedures and unjust verdicts. 
2 Christopher Mooney and Mei-Hsien Lee (1999) describe three abolitionist periods since 1846. The first of these began with Michigan having 
abolished the death penalty (except in the case treason) in 1846; by 1887, three other States followed. The second period takes us back to the early 
twentieth century. Between 1897 and 1940, 10 more States had abolished the death penalty, but eight of these 10 ended up reestablishing it for certain 
circumstances. Finally, beginning in 1957 and until 1972, when this abolition period was ended by Supreme Court intervention, six States had done 
away with capital punishment by 1965; half of these States, however, reestablished the statute for specific cases by 1969.  
3 Bowers (1993) found that opinion polls do not reflect “genuine” support for the death penalty for the expressed death penalty support is spuriously 
induced by the public´s underestimation of the alternatives to capital punishment. Hans Zeisel and Alec Gallup (1989) report that about two-thirds of 
the American public in the late 1980s at this time believed in the deterrent effect of the death penalty while the academic community still seriously 
questioned it. Others have stressed the need to distinguish between informed public opinion and general public support as expressed in opinion polls 
(Vidmar and Ellsworth 1974; Roberts 1992; Hood 1996). 
4 Cesare Beccaria and the Classical School of Criminology made it a point to attack the death penalty as a deterrent measure. Contrary to what many 
authors claim regarding Beccaria´s position on the death penalty, he was not entirely against it. He specified situations for which the death penalty 
could constitute a suitable and proportional level of severity.  Given the historical context at the time, in the Ancient Regime, where there were no 
limits on the cruelty of punishment—the very reason at the root of the Classical School—Beccaria and his followers advocated proportionality of 
penalties (Beccaria 1965). 
5 Sellin compared homicide rates before and after the abolition of the death penalty and between retentionist and abolitionist States with similar socio-
economic and demographic characteristics. He did not control for factors that might affect the homicide rate; he also did not study the impact of the 
effective implementation of the capital punishment threat (Ehrlich 1975). 
6 Being that the nature of these data is quite static, as pointed out above, one might question the causal strength of this relationship.  Erikson (1976), 
Nice (1992), and others have also raised the possibility that the causal relationship might also run in the opposite direction so that we do not know if it 
is really death penalty policy that influences opinion rather than vice-versa.  One could overestimate the effect of opinion on the death penalty policy 
due to a positive feedback reciprocal relationship coming from the death penalty policy. One easy and immediate way to check on this is to consider 
the correlation between a prior measure of public opinion in the pre-Furman period and the readoption of the death penalty in the post-Furman period. 
A coefficient of .456 could suggest that one need not worry too terribly much about a reciprocal relationship here. This troublesome worry of 
reciprocality is a also a factor to take into account when considering the relationship between the murder rate and death penalty policy because one 
could underestimate the relationship due to the potential negative reciprocal feedback.  Given the literature on the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment, it is entirely plausible to wonder if a given State´s policy on the death penalty might influence the murder rate. If one considers, though, 
the correlation between the death penalty policy status in the pre-Furman period and the murder rate at the start of the post-Furman period, .205, one 
may put this worry to the side.  
7 Naïve year and state dummy models were run, but due to the length of this paper, they cannot be shown. Naïve models are simple bivariate 
regressions where the explanatory variables are dummies and the dependent variable, in this case State murder rates, are standardized. Models such as 
these are useful in that they allow one to see where the variation in the dependent variable is coming from.  If the explanatory dummy variables are 
years, the naïve year dummy model will tell us how the murder rate changes with the passage of each year; if the explanatory dummy variables are 
States, a naïve state dummy model will tell us how the murder rate changes across States. 
8 It is plausible to argue that, although at times the evolution of the murder rate may seem to indicate a deterrent effect and at other times fails to do so, 
changes in the murder rate may be mostly attributable to maturation effects (Lempert 1960; Cook and Campbell 1979).  If this is the case, the murder 
rate is really not responding to death penalty policy at all, thus casting doubt on the possibility of duality or reciprocality. 
9 This technique allows one to generate a stability coefficient using combinations of the correlation coefficients of the periods of interest. This stability 
coefficient simply tells us how much change occurs from one time point to the next. The higher these coefficients, the more stable the murder rate. 
These coefficients are obtained from the formulae developed by Heise (1969) using correlational coefficients between the murder rates of the 
appointed times. Judging these coefficients, we can say that the average murder rates did not change much from one decade´s time to the next in either 
period, thus confirming our previous regressional inference from the naïve state and year dummy models. 
10 Previous studies in political science modelling adoption questions have increasingly turned to Event History Analysis (EHA) designs.  Its novelty 
and its purpose make it an attractive analysis tool for political scientists, especially those whose interests lie in policy analysis.   
Depending on the specific research question at hand, the hazard model might not be appropriate. These models estimate how time affects, for instance, 
the adoption of the “Three Strikes” law.  Although other factors that influence the event of adopting the law are also considered and estimated in the 
analyses, it is the time of adoption that EHA really tells us about.  Arguably, this may not be central to the question being asked, but rather the effect 
of a particular independent variable on the adoption of the law. A cross-sectional design with a logit estimation allows me to conduct this analysis in a 
more straightforward way. Why? I am ultimately interested in why State X1 has the death penalty relative to State X2 and not the precise moment a 
particular State adopted or readopted the death penalty.  That precise moment may not be the result of the factors considered in the model, even 
though the model may, for instance, be a good model in explaining the adoption or readoption of the death penalty.  The “hazard” of a particular State 
dropping out of the “at risk” group for capital punishment reform may occur at T1, T2, or T3, etc. depending on one or a series of factors not captured 
in the model, like for example, the personality or moral/political will of the governor in a given State. The explanatory variables will have or not have 
the same causal force, but who decides may mark the difference whether a State readopts in a particular year or the year after, etc. when a new 
governor with a different stance on the subject is elected. Thus, EHA does not further our understanding of the determinants of the 
adoption/readoption of the death penalty any more than would a logit estimation of these determinants. 
